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Abstract
This Article addresses copyright as a viable form of intellectual property
protection for living, organic creations of science and art. The United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc. 1 narrowed patent-eligible protection over living
components of humans or other organisms. Synthetic biologists are
expected to look with renewed focus on copyright law for the intellectual
property protection of biological creations. The contribution of this Article
is to reveal that the same issues are raised with regard to the
copyrightability of the works of synthetic biology as are raised by pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural arts that use and produce living media as their
works. The current contours of copyrightability present four identical
questions that are particularly relevant to and difficult to answer in the
context of science and art that purports to create works of living media:
! Is living media copyrightable subject matter?
! What is authorship (or who is an author) of living media?
! What does it mean to create a fixed and tangible work of living
media?
! What constitutes an original creation of living media under the
originality doctrines of merger and scenes a faire?
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(Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar); BA, Loyola University-Maryland (summa cum laude); Grad.
Cert., Fudan University-Shanghai, China. Professor Murray has written 18 books and
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visited Valparaiso for the Bioethics, Law, and Synthetic Biology Conference, and also
thanks Visiting Professor Candace Kilpinen for organizing the conference. He gives special
thanks to his scientific consultants on synthetic biology, Osman Mirza and Dev Narasimhan,
for their comments and corrections. Finally, he thanks Professors Anthony Casey (Chicago),
Curt Cichowski (Valparaiso), Vinjay Harpalani (Chicago-Kent), David Herzig (Valparaiso),
Aziz Huq (Chicago), Greg Reilly (Chicago), Sandra Sperino (Cincinnati), and Nicholas
Stephanopoulos (Chicago), for their additional comments and suggestions for this Article.
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(holding isolated DNA sequences not patentable).
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This Article will provide an analytical framework for rethinking the
contours of copyright so as to answer these questions by comparing
contemporary scientific methods of creation with artistic methods in order
to determine the copyright narratives and metaphors of subject matter,
authorship, creation, and originality that best address the concerns
underlying these four questions and allow copyright protection over the
works.
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I. Introduction: Copyright and Living Creations
“In other studies you go as far as others have gone before you,
and there is nothing more to know; but in a scientific pursuit
there is continual food for discovery and wonder.”
― MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 37 (Colburn & Bentley
1831)

"Life! Do you hear me? Give my creation ... life!"
― Mel Brooks & Gene Wilder, Young Frankenstein (20th
Century Fox 1974)

DNA Strands

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DNA_strands.gif

Contemporary scientific and artistic methods of creation threaten the
comfortable conceptions and contours of copyright law, particularly the
basic conception of what is copyrightable subject matter, and what it means
to be an author of an original creation fixed in a tangible media. In synthetic
biology, biological engineering, and DNA sequencing, contemporary
scientists are using new technologies and methods of creation, and attempt
to obtain intellectual property rights in new products and creations that
were not producible or even conceivable a decade or, in some cases, even a
year or two ago. At the same time, contemporary artists and designers are
producing living, breathing, growing media as their pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. Judges and practitioners must struggle with issues of what
is copyrightable subject matter, what does authorship and fixation mean,
and what should be the standard of originality in these new works of
biology, genetics, and living art.
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Patent law has had a head start on this intellectual property challenge. In
Chakrabarty, 2 the Supreme Court endorsed the patent claims of a biological
engineer who asserted a claim over an artificially created organism—a
human-engineered bacterium that is useful and innovative in the clean-up of
petroleum (crude oil) spills—and accepted the patent eligibility of a humandesigned and human-engineered living organism.

Chakrabarty Patent 3,813,316, Fig. 1 (May 28, 1974)http://www.google.com/patents/US3813316?
printsec=drawing#v=onepage&q&f=false

Two years after Chakrabarty, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) granted the first human DNA-related patents. 3 Over the
next thirty years, the USPTO and the courts enforced the rule of patenteligibility for isolated DNA molecules, recognizing that the human isolation
of a molecule so as to produce novel and useful applications represents a
patentable advancement over what existed in nature. 4 The USPTO has
granted over 40,000 patents drawn to human genetic material, almost 3,000
of which are specifically directed to isolated DNA molecules.5
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
3. See Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 19, 19 & n.3 (2010); Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398, 2013
WL 860315 at *2-3 (Mar. 7, 2013).
4. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Brief
for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013 WL 860315 at *2.
5. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 19, 40; Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013
WL 860315 at *2. In the mid-1990s, when DNA-related claims had been issuing for over a
decade and upheld by the Federal Circuit, the USPTO evaluated its approach so as to ensure
its compliance with § 101, and “to ensure that examination was of sufficiently high quality.”
The USPTO concluded that “any ‘non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of
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Myriad Genetics Patent 5,747,282, Fig. 4

Chromosome 17-Location of BRCA1

http://intellectualip.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/f
ig4.png

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/com
mons/archive/b/b9/20121109153222%21B
RCA1_de.png
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But events have overtaken patent law’s position with respect to the
intellectual property protection of living creations. Myriad Genetics held that
components of living organisms, such as isolated DNA strands taken from
human genes, are not patent eligible. 6 The Supreme Court has narrowed the
portal to intellectual property patent protection over the products of
synthetic biology. Synthetic biology faces a critical juncture in its effort to
find intellectual property protection for its creations, and biologists’
attention will likely turn to copyright law for the intellectual property
protection of biological creations.

matter’ ” is patent-eligible under § 101. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed.
Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995). The distinction was reinforced in 2001 to provide that “[a]
patent on a gene covers the isolated and purified gene but does not cover the gene as it
occurs in nature.” USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001);
see also Brief for Respondents, Myriad Genetics, 2013 WL 860315 at *2-3.
6. The Court held that isolated DNA strands or isolated components of organisms are
not patent eligible. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2118-19. The Court’s rationale turned on
the finding that Myriad’s claims pertained to DNA sequences that were held to be “naturally
occurring,” “products of nature.” Id. (comparing natural DNA sequence claims to artificially
created, non-naturally-occurring cDNA sequence claims).

6

10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 71 (2014)

[Vol. 10

Copyright is a potential alternative for intellectual property protection of
living creations. 7 But copyright protection may be hindered by precedents
that have limited the copyrightability of living works. 8 Professors Andrew
Torrance and Christopher Holman 9 have been advancing the conversation
regarding copyright, synthetic biology, and DNA sequencing. 10 Professor
Roberta Kwall 11 and several other scholars have confronted the copyright
issues of living media as the subject matter of artistic works. 12 While each
of these scholars has admirably wrestled with some of the questions of
copyrightability, originality, and authorship that I will raise in this work,
their scholarship fails to note the overlap of four identical questions that are
particularly relevant to and difficult to answer in the context of science and
conceptual art that uses and produces living media as its works:

7. As of this writing in August 2013, there is no evidence that a copyright claim over a
synthetical biological creation ever has been litigated.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65.
9. Torrance is Professor of Law, Docking Faculty Scholar, University of Kansas
School of Law. Holman is Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of
Law.
10. See, e.g., Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter Torrance, DNA] (copyrighting DNA sequences); Andrew W. Torrance,
Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 629 (2010) [hereinafter
Torrance, Synthesizing] (discussing intellectual property protections, including copyright, for
synthetic biological works); Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011). It is fair to say the
conversation started with a work by Cornell law professor Irving Kayton. See Irving
Kayton, Copyright in Living Generically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191
(1982)’ see also Tani Chen, Can a Biological Sequence Be Copyrighted?, 19 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 1 (2007); Joseph N. Michelotti, Genes as Intellectual Property, 11 MICH. ST. U.
J. MED. & L. 71 (2007).
11. Raymond P. Niro Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Co-Director, DePaul
University College of Law Center for Jewish Law & Judaic Studies; Founding Director,
DePaul College of Law Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology.
12. See Roberta R. Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology
for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889 (2012); see also Charles
Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 209, 227 (2010); John Nivala, The Landscape Art of Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 267 (2005); Morgan M. Stoddard, Comment, Mother Nature
as Muse: Copyright Protection for Works of Art and Photographs Inspired by, Based on, or
Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REV. 572 (2008). Professor Kwall also has written on narrative
theory and its potential impact on the questions of authorship and creation, which parallels
the angle I have taken on the topics of this Article. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “AuthorStories:” Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship
Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2001).
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! Is living media copyrightable subject matter?
! What is authorship (or who is an author) of living media?
! What does it mean to create a fixed and tangible work of
living media?
! What constitutes an original creation of living media under
the originality doctrines of merger and scenes a faire?
In one sense, questions such as these are not entirely new and
contemporary; copyright law always has had to deal with new technologies
that have challenged conventional thinking on authorship, creation, and
originality, in areas such as photography, 13 chromolithography, 14 motion
pictures, 15 and computer programs. 16 Eventually, each art and science
communicated a narrative containing one or more metaphors of the process
or the product of creation that allowed the expansion of the contours of
copyright to encompass the new technology and art form. Photography
came to be understood not as a science or craft that literally captured
reality, but one that depicted an author’s conception and composition of
reality expressed in photographic media. Cameras came to be understood as
tools that do not operate on their own to take pictures, but require an author
to frame, compose, and create the image, fulfilling the copyright
requirements of
mental
conception
and artistic
creation. 17
13. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Although
photographs were mentioned as a form expressive work in the 1870 Revisions to the
Copyright Act, Act of Congress of July 8, 1870, Rev. St. § 4952, Sarony is the first Supreme
Court case to recognize that photographs are proper subjects of copyright protection.
14. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
15. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242-43 (3rd Cir. 1903); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911).
16. An early copyright question regarding a “program” arose in White-Smith Music Pub.
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), which held that player-piano rolls were not “copies” of
musical compositions and thus could not infringe the compositions. Id. at 16-18. Later, in the
early 1960s, actual computer programs were accepted as “books” or “literature,” even in a
non-human-readable form, such as magnetic tape, as long as a human-readable format
(source code, as opposed to object code) also was deposited with the Register of Copyrights.
See Copyright Office Circular No. 61, 1964 version. Later cases, including Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516
U.S. 233 (1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993);
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701-14 (2d Cir. 1992),
filled in important details in the conception of originality and copyrightability of computer
programs.
17. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
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Chromolithography came to be understood as a new, efficient, speedy, and
cost-effective method of production of two-dimensional color images—the
same images as might appear in paintings or drawings—that require an
author to design and create the images, again fulfilling the copyright
requirements of mental conception and artistic creation. 18 Motion pictures
drew on the accepted “technology” and artistry of pantomimes and
photographs, 19 and computer programs were analogized to literature with
an expressive, communicative purpose, 20 before being codified as a
separate area of copyrightable subject matter.21
Copyright is flexible enough to handle contemporary technologies that
produce living organisms or organic components, but contemporary judges,
practitioners, and scholars must reframe and, in some instances, reimagine
the proper contours of copyrightability in order to bring living works under
copyright protection. 22 This Article does not propose a change in the
copyright code or in the substance of the current interpretative rules and
doctrines promulgated under the code to answer these questions. Copyright
law does not suffer from a lack of meaningful rules on copyrightability,
authorship, creation, and originality. Instead, this Article will provide a
framework for rethinking the contours of copyright by comparing scientific
methods of creation with artistic methods in order to determine the

18. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 59-60; Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444,
452-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
19. Edison, 122 F. at 242-43; Kalem, 222 U.S. at 61. The Townsend Amendment to the
1909 Copyright Act created a class of copyrightable subject matter for dramatic motion
pictures and a class for newsreels and similar non-dramatized material. Act of Aug. 24,
1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 488. Prior to the amendment, motion
picture producers submitted printouts of the cells of their films on long strips of paper as
their deposit of the “photographic prints” of their creation. See Motion Pictures in the
Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS – RES. & REFERENCE SERVS.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mopic/mpcoll.html (Nov. 30, 2012).
20. See generally Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1749-50 (2007).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 101. House Report 94 on the 1976 Act specifically discussed computer
programs as being copyrightable subject matter under the Act. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54
(1976). Later, the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 rewrote 17 U.S.C. § 117 to
clarify the types of rights and possible infringements of software protected under the
Copyright Act.
22. In her 2012 Harvard Law Review article, Professor Rebecca Tushnet examined the
problem of uninformed and disingenuous judicial determinations regarding visual images in
copyright law. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). This Article extends this conversation and analysis to the specific
questions of subject matter, authorship, creation, and originality.
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narratives and metaphors of subject matter, authorship, fixation, and
originality that best address the concerns underlying the four questions
posed above of authorship, fixation, originality, and copyrightability. The
framework grounds the answer to each question with the proper narrative
and metaphor that will allow the works to navigate the restrictions and
limitations of the copyrightability requirement and the originality doctrines
of merger, scenes a faire, functionality, and the idea-expression distinction.
The Article also will discuss the metaphors and narratives that are prone to
failure and that might deny copyright protection to living works of
contemporary art and science. Describing the proper conception of the
nature and scope of a copyright over artistic creations will aid judges and
practitioners in reaching an appropriate conception of the nature and scope
of contemporary scientific creations, allowing a proper, desirable scope of
protection for each scientific and artistic work. 23
II. Living Media as Copyrightable Subject Matter in Art and Synthetic
Biology
Copyrightability is a complicated topic when applied to the creations of
living media. This Article separates the requirement of copyrightable
subject matter from the related concepts of originality, authorship, and
fixation. This section focuses on the narrative and metaphors that will allow
the subject matter of synthetic biology and other arts and sciences
producing works of living media to receive copyright protection.
Copyrightable subject matter is limited. The limitations on protectable
subject matter come from:
! the nature of copyright, which will be compared to patent law,
! copyright law’s requirements of expressive subject matter,
and
! copyright’s idea-expression distinction.
The proper narrative of subject matter is required to navigate the
limitations imposed by the law.

23. A note on methodology: I have included multiple diagrams and illustrations
throughout this article as an intentional reminder and demonstration that the creations of
synthetic biology can be demonstrated and established through visual and other media.
These works have protectable expressive characteristics as graphical-pictorial-sculptural
works in the same way that computer programs have been accepted to have protectable
literary characteristics in both the source code and object code.

10
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The Copyright Code, section 102, states:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work. 24
Section 102 is the statutory source for copyright’s requirements of
expressive subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and the doctrines
of functionality, merger, and scenes a faire. 25 At first blush, copyright
cannot protect a procedure, process, system, method of operation.
Copyright does not protect inventions when characterized as concepts,
principles, or discoveries. 26 Copyright cannot protect formulas and recipes,
including chemical formulas, that list components and ingredients and
layout the process to perform the task. 27
The approved categories of section 102 are expressive works in the form
of literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural
works. There is room for debate whether the listed categories limit the
subject matter of copyright to any particular class or nature of works.
Congress itself declared the list to be illustrative and not limiting. 28 But an
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
25. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993);
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-06 (2d Cir. 1992).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
27. Id; see also Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836; Publ’ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88
F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
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inclusive, illustrative listing in statutory interpretation invites the
application of the ejusdem generis maxim: that the listed words suggest that
items of the same general kind and nature (i.e., the same genus) as the listed
words are acceptable and others are not, and this is to be the guidance for
the evaluation of appropriate subject matter. 29 Thus, the narrative of subject
matter must tell a story of an expressive product of creation. 30
Copyright’s and patent law’s subjects are not mutually exclusive, but
they protect their subjects of creation differently and reward different
products of intellectual creation, satisfying different expectations of
protectability. In contrast to copyright, patent law protection has nothing to
do with expression and everything to do with ideas. In general, a patent can
protect ideas, processes, and procedures that are useful, novel, not
anticipated, and invented by the author. A copyright cannot protect ideas,
processes, or procedures of any nature or form, regardless of how
unprecedented, inventive, useful, or novel they may be.
The Patent Code, section 101, 31 “Inventions patentable,” states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
To drive home the point, the Patent Code, section 100, 32 “Definitions,”
states:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise
indicates –
(a) The term “invention” means invention or discovery.
(b) The term “process” means process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.
29. See, e.g., Todamerica Musica v. Radio Corp. of Am., 171 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1949)
(applying ejusdem generis maxim to sections 2 and 4 of the 1909 Copyright Act defining the
specific subjects of copyright).
30. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (copyright
law limited to original expressive works, and “limits severely the scope of protection in factbased works”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(“The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display
the stamp of the author's originality.”).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 100.

12
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Thus, patent law welcomes and protects all processes, discoveries,
machines, items of manufacture, or compositions of matter.33
Under 17 U.S.C. § 102’s limitations, copyright cannot protect the actual
synthetic biological discovery of a gene-splicing procedure or prevent
others from using the procedure itself. 34 It should follow that copyright
cannot protect an actual, existing sequence of DNA that a biologist has
isolated and discovered that it has significant function in the creation of a
certain protein that can be exploited to create a biological component if the
biologist’s narrative is evaluated as a process or procedure or discovery. 35
Copyright may cover the creation of a purified form of a DNA sequence
that does not exist in nature; the Supreme Court has made that distinction
for patent law and granted patent protection over forms of isolated, purified
DNA sequences—cDNA—that are not naturally occurring products of
nature. 36 Copyright also might protect living media if it can be found to fall
within one of the protected categories—literature; pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works; 37 computer programs, 38 or compilations.

33. Id. §§ 100, 101.
34. An analogous example would be to a recipe, which is unprotectable in copyright as
a formula, process, or procedure when examined as a list of ingredients and instructions for
the preparation of a dish, while recipes might be copyrightable in compilation with
protectable literary expression or creative, artistic layout and presentation. Compare Publ’ns
Intl., Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 474, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (recipes without
literary adornment are not copyrightable), and Lambing v. Godiva Chocolatier, 142 F.3d 434
(Table), 1998 WL 58050 (6th Cir. 1998) (same), and Continental Micro, Inc. v. HPC, Inc.,
No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 309028 at **1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 4, 1997) (same), and Harrell v. St.
John, 792 F. Supp. 2d 933, 943 (S.D. Miss. 2011), and 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (lists of
ingredients not copyrightable), with Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761-64 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (cowboy-themed cookbook combined creative, expressive elements with recipes
in copyrightable compilation).
35. See sources cited supra note 34. Myriad Genetics denied patent-eligibility to
isolated sequences of DNA that are naturally occurring. 133 S. Ct. at 2117-19.
36. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
38. Computer programs are recognized as a specific category of copyrightable subject
matter under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117. The legislative history of the 1976 Act also recognized
programs as copyrightable under the category of “literature.” See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (“‘literary works' . . . includes . . .
computer programs”); id. at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664 (“computer
programs . . . were . . . copyrightable from the outset”); id. at 116, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N.at 5731 (1976 Act recognizes “copyright-ability of computer programs”).
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http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a3/Gene_cloning.svg
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With a little narrative reasoning, 39 that just might be possible.
A. The Narrative of Synthetic Biological Subject Matter
The story of synthetic biology involves some very exciting subject
matter. Practitioners and proponents alike describe the creation of new
DNA sequences leading to new genes, and to the production of
polypeptides and proteins leading to new organic components, life forms, or
entirely new organisms. There is nothing lacking in the potential subjects of
study and creation; only the collective imagination of synthetic biologists
seems able to limit the potential. Detractors warn of the downside—super
germs and viruses, cloning, designer babies—and raise many other
potentially troublesome legal and ethical questions involving the
manipulation of life forms. Nevertheless, the question raised and answered
here is: “Are the products of synthetic biology copyrightable?”
The copyrightable subject matter issue in synthetic biology is affected by
questions of content, as well as by the limits on protection of ideas,
discoveries, and inventions. Even with the question of content, there are
two parts to the issue—first, what is nature of the creation that a synthetic
biologist would seek to protect, and second, can you protect actual living
creations under copyright law.
1. The Nature of the Synthetic Biological Creation as Subject Matter
Regarding the nature of the creation that a synthetic biologist would seek
to protect, the subject matter issue would seem to present a low prospect of
success for the biologist author because compared to patent law, which
welcomes and protects all processes, discoveries, machines, items of
manufacture, or compositions of matter,40 copyright protects only
39. Narrative reasoning, or storytelling, is a form of rhetoric and advocacy, and not
simply a campfire pastime. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW 113-14 (2000); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY ch. 3 (2013); Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807 (1993); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers
on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS
L.J. 459 (2001); Michael D. Murray, Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis: A
Comparative Civil Law and Common Law Analysis, 83-84 BAHÇEŞEHIR ÜNIVERSITESI
HUKUK FAKÜLTESI-KAZANCI HUKUK DERGISI 139 (2011); Michael D. Murray, Rule
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 217 (2011);
DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING
AND THE LAW (1991).
40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101.
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expressive works in the form of literary works; musical works; dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; architectural works; computer programs; and compilations of
protectable or unprotectable content.
Of the several authors writing about copyrightability of natural and
artificially produced gene sequences and synthetic biological components
and organisms, the majority have concluded that the DNA sequences,
components, and organisms are copyrightable.41 These authors have
suggested various metaphors to support the assertion that DNA sequences,
biological components, and newly-generated organisms are works—of
authorship—created by the synthetic biologist: that the work are writings
written by the biologist, 42 that they are compilations, 43 or that they are
programs designed to carry out a biological function. 44 As discussed below,
not all of these metaphors can produce satisfactory copyright protection
over biological works.
The conception of the biologist is greater than most of these analogies. A
deconstruction of the narrative of creation in synthetic biology includes:
! The discovery itself: The creation of knowledge through
study, research, and experimentation to discover the attributes
of DNA sequences and the proteins that might be produced
through manipulation of the coding of the sequences, which in
greater and greater combinations might produce organic
components or actual organisms;
! The invention of the method and process of production:
The creation of a method or process of production of
meaningful DNA sequences that are coded and engineered for
the production of proteins, organic components, and
organisms;

41. See sources cited supra note 10.
42. E.g., Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at 4-6; Torrance, Synthesizing, supra note 10, at
632-35; Holman, supra note 10, at 702-04; Kayton, supra note 10, at 194-96.
43. E.g., Kayton, supra note 10, at 201-03. But see Michelotti, supra note 10, at 86-87
(expressing pessimism about compilation copyrights); Kumar & Rai, supra note 20, at 1748,
1760-62 (discussing large-scale gene syntheses), 1764 (doubts concerning copyrightability
of compilations).
44. E.g., Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at 23-24, 30-34; Holman, supra note 10, at 70916; Kayton, supra note 10, at 198.
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! The writing, rendering, or recording of the steps of
production: The creation of a recorded (written, taped,
coded) description of the steps of the production of
meaningful DNA sequences that are coded and engineered for
the production of proteins, organic components, and
organisms, and a record, description, or depiction of the
sequences, proteins, components, or organisms themselves;
! The creation itself: The actual sequences, proteins,
components, and organisms themselves—in their physical,
material form—that are created by the biologist.
Ideally, biologist authors would receive protection for each of these four
items as the fruits of their intellectual conceptions, rendering, and creations.
In reality, only varying levels of protection may be afforded to each under
copyright law, affording a limited number of rights, and satisfying different
expectations short of the grant of a thick copyright over each instance of
conception and creation. The narrative of the subject matter of the works
might be altered to reflect what may actually be protected under copyright
law:
! Writing, rendering, or recording of the discovery itself:
The literary, visual, or audio-visual writing or recording of the
actual knowledge created through study, research, and
experimentation to discover the attributes of DNA sequences,
the proteins they might code, and in greater and greater
combinations, the dynamic, replicative, perennial components
of actual organisms 45 that the biologist might produce through
manipulation of the sequences and proteins. The writings and
recordings may be protected from unauthorized copying and,
with some limitations, also protected from unauthorized
translation, adaptation, and conversion into other writings,
renderings, or recordings as derivative works of the initial
write-up;

45. My thanks are given to Osman Mirza, my consultant on synthetic biology, for
supplying the proper descriptors here.
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! Writing, rendering, or recording of the processes and
procedures of production: The creation of a recorded
(written, taped, coded) description of the steps of the
production of meaningful sequences, proteins, organic
components, and organisms, which are protected from
unauthorized copying and, to a limited extent, also protected
from unauthorized translation, adaptation, and conversion into
other writings, renderings, or recordings as derivative works
of the initial recorded description;
! Writing, rendering, or recording of the creations: The
creation of a recorded (written, taped, coded) description,
rendering, or depiction of the sequences, proteins, organic
components, or organisms themselves. The goal of this record
of the products of creation would be to prevent the copying or
translation, adaptation, and conversion of the actual recorded
description, rendering, or depiction of the creations into other

Bacterium Cell

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Average_prokaryote_cell-_en.svg
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! writings, renderings, or depictions. At best, this step would
also prevent the creation of actual, living, 3dimensionalderivative works from these 2-dimensional or
audio visual records and descriptions. Ultimate success would
be the right to control the recreation and further use of the
sequences, proteins, organic components, or organisms
themselves as derivative works of the original recorded
description, rendering, or depiction of the sequences, proteins,
organic components, or living organisms;
! Protection of the creations themselves: This final step
would seek copyright protection over the biological creations
themselves in the form of the physical products—the
artificially created sequences, proteins, organic components,
or organisms. The actual creations would be protected from
physical copying, i.e., by culturing or cell-division, and
ultimately this step would afford the biologist the right to
control the recreation and further use of the artificially
produced sequences, proteins, components, or organisms
themselves as derivative works of the original sequences,
proteins, organic components, or living organisms created by
the biologist.
The reconstituted narrative of creation attempts to achieve copyright
protection over the living biological creations themselves and over three
types of recordings and descriptions of the creations. The goal is to achieve
copy-protection for the original creations and for derivative works,
including derivative works produced from the record, depiction, and
description of the creations. 46

46. The copyright derivative works right extends to the creation of physical works from
written plans and designs, such as the creation of 3-dimensional objects based on a
copyrighted 2-dimensional plan. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.01[B] (2008) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; see also Meshwerks, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008); Entm't Research
Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1997);
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); JCW Invs., Inc. v.
Novelty, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033-36 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

2014]

POST-MYRIAD GENETICS COPYRIGHT

19

Excerpt – One Method of Preparation of Complementary DNA
(cDNA) for Cloning, http://www.mun.ca/biology/desmid/brian/
BIOL4900/CB18_31.html (Pearson: Addison Wesley Longman
1999)

The reconstituted narrative places most of the creations of synthetic
biology into categories of expressive media—literature, audio and visual
recordings, or graphical and pictorial works. What is lost is the protection of
the conceptions of discovery and invention. What is preserved is the
protection of the author’s record of the conceptions of discovery and
invention, at least in the literal terms and contents of the record and a limited
number of abstractions from these literal terms and contents in the form of
derivative works. The copying and derivative works protections ought to
slow down competitors who would prefer a quick path to duplicate, recreate,
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Formation of a cDNA Library, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/
e/e6/Formation_of_a_cDNA_Library.jpg

and profit from the actual discoveries and inventions rather than taking the
time and expending the effort to study the art and science of creation from
written and recorded media, learning from it, and applying the ideas,
processes, and procedures step by step, one experiment at a time, so as to
produce the same or similar products on their own.
a) Using Literary, Graphical, Pictorial, Audio, or Audio-Visual Works to
Protect the Biological Creation
The use of expressive media to depict and record the discovery and
invention of a work of synthetic biology might sound mundane, but this
affords the author with the surest protection over the record and description
of the creation. The power of the record and depiction is in the derivative
works right owned by the creator of the expressive work. The prohibition
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Polymerase Chain Reaction,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymerase_chain_reaction#mediaviewer/
File:Polymerase_chain_reaction.svg (Enzoklop Apr. 5, 2014)

not to copy the original expression will extend to the creation of derivative
works created from the writings, depictions, or recordings the biologist has
created. 47 The record and depiction will prevent not only copying of the
expressive works but also derivative works of a real life, 3-Dimensional
nature.
There is value in multiplying the expressions—the records of discovery
or invention—in order to multiply the scope of potential derivative works
that be controlled by the copyright owner. It would be worthwhile to write
up, draw up, and make a film or animation of the actual sequence or
component you have generated. 48 Random, independent creation is
47. See Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., Corp., 147 Fed. Appx. 547, 551-52
(6th Cir. 2005). See also King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924);
Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v.
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
48. Two authors, Stephen Wilson and Willem Stemmer, have discussed encoding the
record of the discovery or invention of DNA sequences into an encrypted MP3 audio file to
take advantage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Stephen R. Wilson, Copyright
Protection For DNA Sequences: Can the Biotech Industry Harmonize Science with Song?,
44 JURIMETRICS J. 409 (2004); Willem P.C. Stemmer, How to Publish DNA Sequences with
Copyright Protection, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 217, 217 (2002). Presumably, the record
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permitted under copyright as only “copying” is precluded, but the
replication of the exact creation described and depicted in the copyrighted
work is not permitted. Multiplying the expressions of the creation will make
it more difficult to explain away every expression, diagram, or description
produced by the original biologist when a competitor asserts a claim of
independent creation.
There is a limitation on the rights sought here in the form of the ideaexpression distinction and its doctrines of merger, scenes a faire, and
functionality. It is true that the ideas behind the creation are open to be used
by all competitors, and any actual processes and procedures described may

Gene, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/

commons/archive/0/07/20100207162502%21Gene.png

would be protected by decryption software that would limit the access to an audience that
was licensed to listen to the discovery. However, after listening to the recording and making
notes, the audience of the work can proceed as if they received a written or unencrypted
report—i.e., the ideas and facts of the discovery would still be available to the audience
under 17 U.S.C. § 102. The only violation would come if the recipient broke the decryption
in order to copy the record. Following up on the ideas, processes, or procedures does not
require duplication of the original media.
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be tried and exploited by others. Ideas, processes, and procedures may be
protected by trade secret or patent law, but not copyright. (These limitations
will be discussed in Section V infra).
A writing and recording of the attributes of a preexisting sequence of
DNA identified by the biologist would have the lowest potential to deter a
competitive use of the information in the writing. Preexisting sequences
identified and described by the biologist can be “refound” and used by
others. Nevertheless, the protections on copying and creating derivative
works may slow down the retransmission of information regarding the
creation.
b) Using the Metaphor of a Compilation to Protect the Actual Biological
Creation
The protection of actual biological works may be attempted under the
category of compilation. This is described as a metaphor of compilation
because the true biological task is not the combination of separate
expressive parts to make a collective whole with greater expressive
potential, as in the case of a collage, 49 or doll’s face, 50 or computer graphics
interface. 51 Instead, the biologist seeks to create a unitary whole creation,
whether it be a DNA sequence, a protein, a biological component, or a
complete organism.
The copyright code anticipates that creative, original combinations of
copyrightable or non-copyrightable elements may be protected. Section 101
of the Code reads in part: “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship. . . .” 52 While this
definition requires no analogy or abstraction—existing, recombined, or
manipulated sequences, proteins, and components may be selected and
arranged to produce an original work designed and created by the biologist
author—the results may be less than desirable. Compilations are protected
as compilations. To claim a copyright on the basis of a compilation might
suggest that the component parts of the compilation are not themselves
49. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 3.02; Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 53132 (9th Cir.2007); Harris v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
50. E.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
51. Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346 (5th Cir.
1994); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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protected or in fact are not copyrightable; otherwise, why seek protection
for the creation only as a compilation. And the non-copyrighted or noncopyrightable component parts of a compilation generally may be used
freely by others—the only identified original creation of the author is the
complete combination, and only that exact combination is protected. 53
Thus, it would seem to be true that a compilation of organic parts could be
reverse-engineered and that a second, skilled biologist might recreate the
effect of the work in a slightly altered but nonetheless original combination
without violating the copyright of the first biologist.
If the argument may be made that the desired biological effect may only
be achieved by the single combination of organic components created by
the original author, this argument would invite the application of the merger
doctrine (discussed at greater length in Section V, infra) and would
preclude copyright protection over the single means to achieve the result.
Lastly, the component parts are themselves organic substances—
components of living creatures—meaning that a claim to a compilation
copyright is claim to own a monopoly over a component of a living
creature, even a human being. This argument (discussed at greater length in
Section II(B), infra) might find a difficult reception with many judges and
other legal audiences. Therefore, there are significant downsides and
limitations to the compilation narrative.
c) Using the Metaphor of a Computer Program to Protect the Actual
Biological Creation
The protection of actual creations—new sequences of DNA, biological
components, and new organisms created through the manipulation of
sequences, polypeptides, and proteins—is the most important and desirable
protection to be obtained in copyright. The simplest narrative is that the
biologist created a new, original—something—fixed in a tangible medium. If
it were possible in copyright law to fill in the blank with DNA sequence,
protein, organic component, or organism, our discussion would be finished
here. But copyright requires a certain something—an expressive something.
Section 102 of the code, quoted above, requires “original works of author-

53. In Mattel v. Goldberger Dolls, Mattel was able to claim a copyright in the total
combined concept and appearance of Barbie’s face, even though, in isolation, each feature of
Barbie’s face—large, widely-spaced eyes, accentuated eyebrows and lashes, pert nose, and
bow-shaped lips—were standard features in doll faces of all kinds, and thus individually
unprotectable. Only the total compilation that said, “Barbie’s face,” to a viewer was
protected.
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Gene Splicing
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0a/DNA_alternative_splicing.gif

ship fixed in any something—an expressive something. Section 102 of the
code, quoted above, requires “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.” Further, the expressive works must be
analogous to the categories of works listed as illustration. And finally, the
protectable attributes of the work must be expressive, not functional.54
Several authors have suggested that a creation of synthetic biology is
analogous to a computer program, one of the categories provided for in 17
U.S.C. § 102. 55 Sequences of DNA, biological components, and new
organisms are programmed by the biologist through the manipulation of
sequences, polypeptides, and proteins to produce the effects and results
conceived of by the biologist, just as an existing computer language is
manipulated by the computer programmer to produce the effects and results
conceived of by the programmer.
Comparing the question of the copyrightability of DNA sequences and
artificially-produced proteins, organic components, and organisms to the
copyrightability of computer programs is the narrative with the greatest
potential for success. The computer program analogy is especially apt
because DNA sequences already are commonly analogized by synthetic
biologists as programs that order the production of proteins and

54. Various: 17 USC 101, 102(a), (b); Blake v. Selden, Mazer v. Stein, Esquire Lamp,
etc.
55. See sources cited supra note 10.
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subsequently of biological organisms. 56 Thus, the practitioners of the art
believe in this metaphor and can support it if push comes to shove in a
copyright dispute.
(1) Computer Programs—Two Levels of Metaphor
Computer programs became protected under copyright law as a form of
writing and literature by virtue of a two-part metaphor. The first layer of the
metaphor is that a program written in source code or expressed in object
code is in fact a writing, a medium of expression akin to literature. The
second layer is that that the writing is written for the purpose of
communicating something to an audience. There are in fact two audiences
for the writing: the computer (reading the object code), and trained
computer programmers (reading the source code).
Computer programs are written in a language—a system of symbols that
are assigned to represent the operation of combinations of on-off signals
(1’s and 0’s, a binary radix) controlling the flow of electric current in a
computer device (e.g., a chip or processor). There is no metaphor at the first
level because a computer language is a “language,” an assigned system of
symbols to represent some other thing or operation in the traditional
methodology common to all languages. Thus the metaphor begins with
writing:
Writing:. The first layer of metaphor is that of a computer
programmer who “writes” or “composes” a work of literature—a
program—making use of the existing computer language. The
program is what is offered for copyright.
Communicative Work: The metaphor at the second level of
“writing” fits the program under the category of “literature,” a
writing with a communicative, expressive objective. This was
not an enormous hurdle to leap because the program itself is
expressive—it is written in symbols that can be recognized and
interpreted by those familiar with the language and
communicated to audiences who are not familiar with the
language.
Computer programs are not altogether different from traditional literature
that operates at two levels of metaphor—a language, such as English, that
56. Or as Crick, of the DNA pioneer duo, Watson and Crick, once pointed out: “DNA
makes RNA, RNA makes protein, and proteins make us.” Torrance, DNA, supra note 10, at
13 (quoting EVELYN FOX KELLER, THE CENTURY OF THE GENE 54 (2000)).
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consists of letters and words that represent something else, and an author
who writes or composes a work of authorship using the existing language to
produce a result—the communication of thoughts and feelings to those who
can read and understand the existing language, and who might further
interpret and communicate it to others who do not know the existing
language. What is different about computer language is the environment in
which the language and the program operate—computers—and the
“audience” for the program—again, computer processors—as opposed to
traditional literature, which can operate in any environment where actual
humans can read or listen to the creation of the author. Of course, computer
programs gained a special boost when Congress amended the copyright
code to make it plain that computer programs are copyrightable, removing
the necessity to analogize computer programs to traditional literature.57
(2) Biological Creations—Three Levels of Metaphor
A biological creation is even more complicated that a computer program
and has an additional layer of metaphor: first, DNA must be analogized to a
language; second, sequencing or splicing and manipulating DNA, and
further manipulating polypeptides to produce proteins and biological
components, must be analogized to writing in a language; and third, the end
product must be analogized to a work of expression that communicates
something. To illustrate this further and more specifically, in synthetic
biology, the layers of metaphoric analogy may be broken down as follows:
Language – that DNA is a “language” of four symbols (A, T, G,
C) representing actual chemical nucleotides, adenine, thymine,
guanine, and cytosine that in combination are the basis of all
DNA and, by extension, all polypeptides, proteins, biological
components, and organisms;
Writing – that a biologist who identifies a sequence of DNA, or
acts to produce a new sequence of DNA or to produce something
more complex building on new sequences of DNA, actually
“writes” or “composes” a work (see the discussion of
“communicative
work”
below)
of
expression
and
communication using a language in a manner that is analogous
to the writing of a computer program or even the writing of
actual, traditional literature;

57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117.
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DNA Structure

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/DNA-structure-andbases.png

Communicative Work – that the resulting DNA sequence,
protein, component, or organism, identified or composed by the
biologist is an expressive, communicative “work of authorship,”
a creation of the mind, analogous to a computer program or work
of literature.

2014]

POST-MYRIAD GENETICS COPYRIGHT

29

There are difficulties in each analogy. First, it must be accepted that the
chemical formula representing a compound known as one of the four
nucleotides is represented symbolically not just by the compound name
(e.g., adenine) but also by the first letter, “A,” of the compound. And
second, that this assignment has expressive qualities meeting our
understanding of the term, language. It is noteworthy that the audience for
the “A-T-G-C” language is the biologists and other humans studying the
actual processes of nature, which is different from the “audience” of the
chemical compounds themselves, which are other compounds,
polypeptides, and proteins at the level of organic chemistry.
The metaphor of writing, or authorship, is troublesome because the
biologist is dealing not simply with a language with which the biologist
writes and composes to produce a communicative result, but instead, with
actual organic chemical compounds, components, and organisms that are
manipulated to produce additional sequences of compounds, components,
and living things. Taken by itself, the writing metaphor might be analyzed
as a double metaphor—that the language of the writing is a symbolic
representation of biological subjects, and the biologist’s working with the
biological subjects is in some ways analogous to writing up something that
can be expressed in the language and understood by others trained in the
language—and each half of the double metaphor relies on the audience’s
understanding and acceptance of the other.
The expressive, communicative nature of the results of the writing also
works on two levels because the biologist programs the biological
components to communicate the designed biological results on an organic
level, and the work itself also can be read by other biologists who will
understand its use of the biological language.
The metaphor of a work or creation relies on the acceptance of the first
two layers of metaphors. Then, the third layer follows directly, because the
end product of the biologist’s working with the biological subjects is a new
biological subject that can be expressed using the symbols and terms of the
language, and can produce results—communicative, expressive results to
biologists trained in the language that stand in for the actual real life
biological results—new sequences, organic components, and organisms—
produced by the biologist.
If successfully communicated and accepted, the complete formula means
that the products of synthetic biology—the new sequences, components,
and organisms produced by the biologist—are themselves protected under
copyright. They may not be duplicated or replicated or adapted into new
products of synthetic biology. The argument is difficult both to
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communicate and to achieve the proper understanding and acceptance by
the audience, but it has a tremendous upside in achieving exactly what the
biologist author wishes to achieve.
The strengths of the computer program analogy, however, also suggest
its weaknesses. As with compilations, if the argument is made that the
desired biological effect may only be achieved within the language of DNA
sequences by the combination of organic components created by the
original author, this argument would invite the application of the merger
doctrine (discussed at greater length in Section V, infra), and would
preclude copyright protection over the single means to achieve the result.
And once more, the program designed and written by the biologist,
however analogized or abstracted, still represents actual organic
substances—components of living creatures—meaning that a claim to a
program copyright is claim to own a monopoly over a component of a
living creature, even a human being. As discussed in Section II(B), infra,
this argument, might find a difficult reception with many judges and other
legal audiences.
Each of the levels of metaphor might fail—the biological work might not
be regarded as a written work of language that is expressive—thus making
the entire exercise potentially subject to failure when a claim or defense is
attempted to be communicated to a court or to other legal practitioners. In
other words, the fact that the audience of the argument must recognize and
accept the analogies drawn from three levels of metaphors is a long row to
hoe for the biologist and her lawyer. Nevertheless, this formula offers the
best chance of protecting actual works of synthetic biology because the path
has been cleared for the acceptance of each level of the metaphor by the
precedent of computer programs. Biological creations are a logical
extension of this metaphor, and by this extension, the entire creation of the
biologist may be protected.
d) Failure Narratives: Using Metaphors of a Recipe or Chemical
Formula
A good lawyer and advocate will hope for the best and prepare for the
worst. As complicated as the above discussion in Section II(A)(1)(c) might
sound, the computer program metaphor is the preferred metaphor for DNA
sequencing and especially for artificially-produced DNA sequences,
proteins, organic components, and organisms. If the counterargument gains
traction that the proper analogy for works relating to synthetic biology is of
a recipe or chemical formula, then copyright law most likely will not
provide adequate protection for synthetic biologist authors.
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A true recipe or chemical formula is a description of a process and the
ingredients needed for the process to produce a certain result. As such, the
recipe or formula is nearly entirely unprotectable under Section 102 of the
copyright code and its associated doctrines of functionality and merger. The
wording, layout, and formatting of a recipe or chemical formula may be
protected under copyright, but not the formula itself, nor the ingredients
described in the formula. A competitor might argue that the narrative of
creation of synthetic biology is that the biologist made a discovery
(unprotectable event in copyright law) of the DNA components (preexisting
material, not created by the biologist) and their properties (preexisting
material, not created by the biologist) as a recipe or chemical formula to
follow to produce a functional result.
Many if not all of the ingredients of a typical recipe or formula were not
created by the author, and anyone can take preexisting ingredients and
follow the same recipe or formula to produce the product. The same might
be said of certain “ingredients” of a creation of synthetic biology. This
observation alone is not so damning because it suggests a possible
counterargument—that if the components were in fact created by the
biologist author, then they may not be freely used by subsequent biologists.
However, how any one component used in the larger recipe came to be
created may itself face the characterization of a recipe or formula, and so
on, all the way down, until only preexisting biochemical elements with
functional properties were discovered to be useful when manipulated to
produce a component that became an ingredient used in combination with
other preexisting or created components (ingredients) for brewing up a
certain biochemical result. It is unfortunate that the recipe or chemical
formula narrative is so simple to state; its simplicity and elegance is one of
its greatest strengths.
The strongest counterargument to the assertion that synthetic biology is
akin to a recipe or formula is the narrative of the work as a computer
program. A computer program is not just a description of a process, it is
itself a creation, written by the biologist as a whole work with an expressive
function and purpose. True, a program, recipe, or formula each can be
followed to produce a result, but that is where the comparison ends. Even
an original creative compilation (Section II(A)(2) supra) is a complete
whole, valuable in its expressive attributes because of the original and
creative way it is compiled. A computer formula is well beyond that. It is a
complete, composed work analogous to a work of literature. A recipe is to a
novel what a simple chemical formula is to a creation of synthetic biology.
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B. The Narrative of Living Artistic Works
The above discussion leads to the second topic of this section on
copyrightable subject matter: what is the proper narrative of living artistic
works that preserves the greatest copyrightable content of the works.
The success or failure of a narrative of synthetic biology will turn in part
on the author’s ability to defuse or overcome copyright law’s reservations
concerning living media. This is the first overlapping issue with artistic
creations using living subject matter, namely: Can an artist or scientist
copyright a living, growing, organic, living thing?
Patent law has answered this question, “yes,” if the organism was created
by the author. 58 This should give hope to biological or artistic designers.
After all, if United States patent law is amenable to a twenty-year complete
monopoly on the creation, duplication, growing, or exploitation of a living
organism, why shouldn’t copyright law be amenable to a more limited, but
longer term monopoly solely on duplication through exact replication or
derivative works?
Synthetic biological creations have yet to be the subject of a copyright
infringement litigation, so it would be prudent to look to an analogous area
for input and interpretation of this copyrightable subject matter issue. The
counterargument is found in artistic expression cases, most notably, Kelley
v. Chicago Park District. 59
Kelley tells the tale of Chapman Kelley, an artist of landscapes (as
opposed to a landscaper or floral designer 60) who created a large pictorial
display of living wildflowers in Grant Park in downtown Chicago, titled
“Wildflower Works.” The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit both had a
terrifically difficult time getting their judicial heads around the case—or at
least it would appear so from the approach to the artistic work taken by both
courts in the case. The opinions are two more confirmations of what Justice
Holmes said 110 years ago: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations…” 61

58. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313-18 (1980), and Myriad Genetics, 133
S. Ct. at 2118-19, both held that living, breathing organisms created by a scientist could be
the subject of a patent.
59. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
60. See John Nivala, The Landscape Art of Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (2005).
61. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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Kelley's Plan for Wildflower Works
http://www.rarin.org/index.php/File:KelleyChicagoAerial.JPG

Wildflower Works Installation, http://clancco.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/CWFW1992.jpg

The non-precedential trial court opinion found that the work was a
painting or sculpture, and further found that it was a “work of visual art”
under 17 U.S.C. § 101, and qualified as a “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
[work]” under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); nevertheless, the work was held not to
be copyrightable because it was held to be not original, although it was not
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copied from any other work. 62 The more relevant and detrimental opinion is
that of the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the trial court in most respects,
and found that the Wildflowers Works installation was original, but that it
could not be copyrightable because of the nature of the living media,
wildflowers, which were held to be not fixed in a tangible media, and not
authored by Kelley. 63
Note that, although the court’s determination is persuasive authority
against a broad recognition of the copyrightability of works made from
preexisting living media, it is not a refutation of living media as subjects of
copyright. It is a refutation of preexisting growing, moving, living objects
as being copyrightable because they are not fixed in a tangible medium and
not authored by the artist or other purported “creator” of the works other
than God or Mother Nature.
The authorship equation used by the Seventh Circuit is that Kelley’s
work is made up of plants; Kelley didn’t create the plants (God did), so he
is not the author of the plants. The plants make up the garden; Kelley is
responsible for the garden being there, but he did not create the plants in the
garden, so see the first answer here. On fixation, the Seventh Circuit notes
that plants sway in the breeze, they move, they grow, they wither, they die;
therefore, they are not fixed. 64 The authors of the narratives of living
subject matter must be cognizant of this viewpoint.
There appear to be few cases on the issue of copyrightability of living
subject matter—Kelley appears to be a loner, and Kelley cites no other cases
on this point. 65 My research has failed to produce other cases directly on

62. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886 at *5, 6 (N.D. Ill.
Sep. 29, 2008).
63. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (“The real impediment to copyright here is not that
Wildflower Works fails the test for originality (understood as ‘not copied’ and ‘possessing
some creativity’) but that a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation
normally required to support copyright . . . .”).
64. Id. at 304-05.
65. Analogous cases such as Cockburn v. SWS Industries, Inc., No. C10–1566RSL,
2011 WL 2295145 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 8, 2011), Dimitrakopoulus v. Flowers by Demetrios,
79 Civ. 6961 (RLC), 1983 WL 1135 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1983), and Florabelle Flowers, Inc.
v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), are somewhat useful in
predicting the analysis of living media. The cases involved the creation of artificial flowers.
The courts did not balk at copyright protection for these creations, they simply limited the
copyright and the protectable elements according to the scenes a faire and merger doctrines.
See also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007); Satava v.
Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810-11 (9th Cir. 2003); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090,
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point. It is noteworthy that Kelley does not preclude living media, it simply
divides the issue into two questions: (1) are living works fixed, and (2) are
living works authored? I will follow this path in my analysis, too.
III. Fixation Narratives of Living Media
Regarding fixation, the statutory standard is “fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.” 66 Section 101 elaborates on this
requirement, stating: “A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.” 67 “Author” or “authored” are not separately
defined, but “created” is: “A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes
the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different
versions, each version constitutes a separate work.” 68
Fixation is not dependent on media. To assure that copyright law
remained media neutral, Congress defined fixation of works to include “any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”69
The legislative history of the fixation provision states:
This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely
unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as [WhiteSmith] . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the
1093 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
67. Id. § 101 (definition of “fixed”). “Copies” are “material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the material
object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.” Id. (definition of
“copies”).
68. Id. (definition of “created”).
69. Id. § 102(a); Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality,
and New Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 429 (2005).
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work is fixed. Under the bill it makes no difference what the
form, manner, or medium of fixation may be—whether it is in
words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in
written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception
directly or by means of any machine or device “now known or
later developed.” 70
This leads to the language of 17 U.S.C. § 101, quoted here more
completely:
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A
work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission . . . .71
Fixation is supposed to be a simple, open-ended, painfully easy to satisfy
concept. The need to perceive the creation is all that matters, and you can
even use machines to do the perception. If the creation is oral or fleeting or
otherwise transitory in nature, you can record it with a longer-lasting media
such as a visual, audio, or audio-visual recording that depicts or records the
creation.
Wildflower works should have met each of the fixation criteria. It could
be seen, felt, smelt, and even tasted if you wanted to try any of these
experiences. It existed in drawings, photographs, and other depictions and
descriptions. Its nature was known well enough to copy it or avoid copying
it. The nature of the creation was no mystery to anyone.
IV. Authorship and the Narrative of Creation of Works in Living Media
A. Authorship of Works of Living Media Beyond God or Mother Nature
The creation issue is similarly easy to resolve. With living artistic subject
matter, there is no pressing need for a metaphor or analogy to the creation
of copyrightable subject matter—the works are expressive works in the

70. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5665 (1976).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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form of pictorial or sculpture media. Pictorial and sculptural works are
category 5 of copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
The Kelley courts’ interpretation of authorship is that:
! art installations containing living media (e.g., wildflowers)
cannot be a painting or sculpture because they are flowers and
plants, and the artist did not create the flowers and plants;
! art installations containing living media cannot be a painting
or sculpture because they move, they change, they grow, or
they wither and die;
! art installations are not paintings or flowers because they are a
garden.
First, the criticism that a work cannot be a painting because it consists of
living items mistakes media for creation of expression. Every painting is
made of something—its media. At some level of immediacy, the media is
traceable to a natural organic or chemical substance that was formed or
grown in or on the earth. The canvas is traced to cotton duck or linen,
which is traced to the cotton plant, which grew out of the earth. The
stretcher bars are made of wood which grew up as a tree. The paint medium
might be a naturally occurring substance such as charcoal or raw umber, or
a slightly more complicated composition of lapis lazuli and linseed oil
making ultramarine, or a chemical composition of matter constituting
Prussian blue or one of the many synthetic hues that have become the
normal media in artistic production. Sculpted media is similarly situated,
substituting only a natural or manipulated media of clay, stone, metal, or a
casting media that is plastic (i.e., malleable, able to be molded or shaped).
An expression using existing media is copyrightable regardless of the form
of media used; copyright law intentionally is media-neutral. 72
Second, the fact that creations of living media might move, or change, or
grow, or wither and die and decompose again is not indicative of the
element of authorship or of fixation. Consider that any work using
wildflowers or some other living, organic media could be frozen in time by
encasing it in Lucite or actually keeping it frozen at a sufficiently low
temperature to keep it from decaying. Does that make the expression of the
work different—regarding as we must that it is the expression of the work

72. Compare the definition of a “work of visual art” in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which was
defined in a completely different, media-dependent manner so as to carefully delineate
works subject to moral rights protection from works that will not be protected.
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that causes us to think of copyright protection at all. Even absent that
treatment, the comparison of the movability of one form of work versus
another simply is a matter of degree: all painting surfaces are susceptible to
expansion and contraction from humidity levels and temperature; they just
move at so small a rate that we would hardly trouble to measure it.
Sculptures of stone may be less moveable from temperature than metal, but
again, the movement in each case is hardly noticeable. The movement by
wind and air current works a great effect on wildflowers and plants in the
great outdoors, less so indoors, but not much less than the workings of air
currents on paper mobiles and other delicate sculptures. All materials
degrade over time, although with some care there are media that seem
“permanent.” All that this reflects is our comfort level with a semblance of
permanence corresponding to our time of observation in the presence of the
work. A highly fugitive dye placed in direct sunlight will give up its color
faster than a wildflower. Neither is permanent, and the relative speed of
alternation is easily observable but hardly seems remarkable when one is
considering the potential of a work to express original creative attributes
protectable in copyright.
Last, the fact that some artistic installations might resemble something
else—a garden—is not a question concerning copyrightability, it is one of
aesthetics and philosophy. If the issue was, is this “art,” we might ponder
for a time whether an expressive composition of living matter was
sufficiently artistic to meet our standards when it was created by a selfproclaimed gardener as opposed to a self-proclaimed or externally certified
artist. We tend not to credit the work of first-time amateurs as high art,
although on occasion the results are very intricate and beautiful.
Nevertheless, the issue here is copyrightability, and the artistic merit of the
work or the creator never has been a requirement for copyrightability.
And what makes living media expressive? Color, shape, forms,
textures—all of which are possessed by wildflowers and living media as
well and often to a greater degree than other media, such as paint in tubes,
blank canvas, or a mound of sculpting clay. The same attributes of color,
shape, forms, and textures that provide the difference in the expression
perceived from a blank white canvas compared to that of a highly detailed
landscape are provided by a palate of wildflowers combined and arranged
on dark earth.
V. Originality Narriative of Creations of Living Media
All of the above discussion of analogies and narratives leads to the first
genuine, inescapable flaw that may affect the desirability of protecting the
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work of synthetic biology through copyright: the work of authorship
claimed through the triple metaphor of synthetic biology described above is
a work that manipulates real life organic compounds and sequences of
compounds in order to produce dynamic, replicative, perennial components
of living organisms. This fact is exactly the point of seeking copyright
protection in the first place—biologists want to protect their living,
growing, multiplying works from unauthorized duplication. The true value
to the scientist and the world is not the expressive, communicative potential
of the work. It is the fact that it is a living thing or a component of a living
thing that performs a role to change aspects of other living things that
matters to the scientist. This statement represents the awesome potential of
synthetic biology. 73 But living subject matter is a troublesome subject for
copyright’s originality requirements.74
A. Originality and Living Media: the Story of First Creations
The creation of original expression is the essential requirement for a
copyrightable work. 75 “The sine qua non of copyright is originality.” 76
Originality is the very “premise of copyright law.”77
The definition of original is “not copied,” 78 rather than something that is
entirely new, fresh, novel, and excessively creative. 79 “Originality does not
signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles
other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of
copying.” 80

73. E.g., Torrance, Synthesizing, supra note 10, at 632-39; Torrance, DNA, supra note
10, at 22-26; Andrew Torrance, Patenting Human Evolution, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075,
1084-91 (2008); Holman, supra note 10, at 701-03.
74. Not so for patent law. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), held that
living, breathing organisms could be the subject of a patent.
75. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 247–48 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973).
76. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
77. Id. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
78. Id. at 346-47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884);
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
79. .Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“[C]opyright
protects originality rather than novelty or invention . . . ”). In contrast, patent protection
requires an invention that is novel and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006).
80. .Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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The narrative of originality for synthetic biology is simple: the synthetic
biologist demonstrates that the work was her own conception and
execution, not copied. Thus, the “not copied” requirement of originality
presumably will be easy to meet, unless a biologist has copied someone
else’s biological creation. A biologist who creates a new work according to
the narratives of creation and subject matter discussed above, without
copying another’s work, will have an original work. But the scope of the
copyright over this original creation is likely to be reduced by the ideaexpression doctrine under 17 U.S.C. § 102 and its two sub-doctrines of
merger and scenes a faire.
In the subject matter section, the goal was to discover the best narrative
for the creations of synthetic biology so as to preserve the largest possible
scope of the copyright. The problem of copyrightability discussed in
Section II(A) supra concerns whether the sum and substance of the
intellectual products of synthetic biology are discoveries or inventions of
uncopyrightable ideas, processes, procedures that manipulate preexisting
materials possessing natural, chemical characteristics, none of which was
authored by the biologist, so as to produce functional results. This blunt
assertion is not fatal to the claim of copyright over synthetic biological
works, but it does point to the need to securely fix the story of original
creation by the biologist author in a stable media so as to preserve a proper
scope of protection over the biologist’s works.
Although no copyright claim is known to have been litigated concerning
synthetic biology, a prediction can be made that there are many ideas
behind the creation that cannot be brought within the copyright. As in
patent law, the operation of nature cannot be claimed by any human author,
nor can the raw material used by the biologist to make the creation. To the
extent that the creation uses a formula (process, or procedure) in the act of
creation, this formula will not be protected by copyright. If the formula was
the whole point of the biological activity, the copyright obtained over the
product of the formula may be unsatisfactory. This, of course, is a
significant difference between patent law and copyright law—the former
protects ideas and inventions including formulas, processes, and
procedures; the latter protects no ideas, and no formulas, processes, or
procedures.
Living artistic works are likely to fare better in the balance of ideas vs.
expression. One can imagine that an artist might develop a highly inventive
process of creation of living media, and would face similar problems under
copyright’s idea-expression distinction as a biologist would. The inventive
artist might one day find the need to investigate patenting an artistic

2014]

POST-MYRIAD GENETICS COPYRIGHT

41

technique or process of creation. But in general, the development of
innovative techniques and processes is not the creative endeavor that
matters the most to an artist. It is the expression that makes the artist, and
the original expressive qualities of the work are the most likely to survive
the application of the idea-expression doctrine.
B. The Scope of the Author’s Copyright After the Application of the Merger
and Scenes a Faire Doctrines
Ideas are not monopolized in copyright law. Others may learn from the
ideas reflected in synthetic biological works, and may use that knowledge
to pursue a myriad of original projects that do not duplicate the works of the
first biologist. This is one of the main reasons why copyright might be a
sufficient mode of protection for some synthetic biologists whose
achievements are an original creation with highly expressive, nonfunctional characteristics—the kind of work that copyright can protect from
duplication and give a fair scope of protection for derivative works. On the
other hand, some biological creations will be largely defined by the
practical functions of the creation. These functional aspects will not be
protected by copyright, and if the functioning appears to follow the form of
the work, the merger doctrine will limit the scope of copyright protection
for the original and any derivative works. Patent law may be a more
desirable vehicle of protection than copyright for these functional works
Discussion of originality in copyright law begins with one axiomatic
proposition: there can be no valid copyright in facts. 81 “[N]o author may
copyright his ideas 82 or the facts he narrates.” 83 The key to understanding
the merger doctrine and scenes a faire doctrine lies in understanding why
facts are not copyrightable.

81. Id. at 344. The Feist case and the originality requirements defined therein are
discussed in Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 and Beyond: Two Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 169-70 (2003); Daniel Gervais, Feist Goes
Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality In Copyright Law, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC. 949 (2002); Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller &
William F. Patry, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too
Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 660-63 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-87 (1992).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
83. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985).
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No one may claim originality as to the reporting and publication of
facts. 84 Facts, meaning data and information about the world, do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship. 85 The first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its
existence. 86 Facts are not original to an author who writes about the facts.
All facts—scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day—belong
to the public domain and are available to every person. 87
Nevertheless, while others may copy the underlying facts and ideas from
a publication, they may not copy the exact words or arrangement used to
present them. 88 For example, the facts of a president’s life are subject to
copying and republication but not his exact words and phrases regarding
public figures and public events written in an autobiography. 89 The artist’s
or scientist’s creative expression and embodiment of the idea is protected.90
Copyright assures authors the right to control their original expression, but
encourages others to borrow the underlying ideas and themes used by the
original author and create their own original expression. 91 This principle,
known as the idea-expression dichotomy, applies to all works of
authorship. 92
The definition of an “idea” in a literary work often is the most difficult
aspect of the idea-expression dichotomy. 93 Judge Learned Hand
characterized the difficulty in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.94 as
arising from the fact that an idea as opposed to the expression of the idea in
literature can be manipulated by viewing the interest protected by copyright

84. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1.4
(2005) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT]; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, §
2.11[A].
85. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4.
86. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4.
87. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369
(5th Cir. 1981); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.2.1.4.
88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
89. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57, 563
(1985).
90. Id.; Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49.
91. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57.
92. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-57. See generally
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.
93. See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.1.1; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 45, § 1.10[B][2].
94. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).

2014]

POST-MYRIAD GENETICS COPYRIGHT

43

at differing levels of abstraction.95 If protection is limited to the words as
they appear on the page—a strictly literal application of the term
“expression”—the protection for original “Writings” envisioned by the
Constitution 96 would be considerably thin. 97 A new author could imitate the
plot, character types, exposition, conflict, resolution, and all other original
elements of a novel so long as she changed the wording. 98 But if protection
extends to the full range of derivative works that might be expressed by the
author arising from the author’s fleshing out of an “idea” in literature, then
an author could claim property rights to an entire genre. 99 Edgar Allan Poe
or Wilkie Collins could have captured the mystery genre with the
publication of a single mystery story; the innovators of the first reality
television show, Survivor, might have deprived the public of The Amazing
Race, Fear Factor, Big Brother, or even Temptation Island. 100
The difficulty is not present in visual works or living media. There are a
myriad of possible ways to express ideas visually; 101 similarly, there are a
myriad of possible creations of synthetic biology. A new author need only
refrain from copying one. A perfect example of the idea-expression
dichotomy in visual works is the case of photography. Photography takes as
its subject the concrete objects (the facts) of the world around us, and yet
for over a hundred and twenty years the Supreme Court has recognized that
works of photography are sufficiently creative and original as to obtain the
protection of copyright. 102 This is true for staged and posed subjects of
95. Id. at 121; see also Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990)
(discussing Nichols).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
97. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 1.10[B][2]; see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 83, § 2.3.1.2
98. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
99. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, §§ 1.10[B][2], [C][2]; see also GOLDSTEIN
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.
100. Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540; Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 291 (3d
Cir. 2004) (Roth, J. dissenting).
101. See Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004)
(innumerable ways of depicting doll faces); Southco, 390 F.3d at 292 (Roth, J. dissenting)
(Southco's numbering rules and the resulting numbers are one of many possible expressions
of the idea of using a code to convey product specifications); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman,
979 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Atari II) (Ginsburg, J.), appeal after remand from 888
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Atari I) (Ginsburg, J.) (innumerable ways of depicting breakout
game features).
102. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Leigh v.
Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000). Yet, there are dissenting voices
regarding the recognition of photography as a creative, original, copyrightable media. See
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photographs as well as for advertising and for more natural or random snapshots. 103 What the author of a photograph work brings to the creativity and
originality equation is an artist’s sense of composition, angle, exposure, Fstop and aperture settings, background, and lighting, and creation of certain
elements of the scene. 104 In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 105 the Southern
District of New York categorized this originality into three specific areas:
rendition (angle, light, shade, exposure, filter effects, developing
techniques, or composition) of the photograph, the timing of the photograph
(how it fortuitously or consciously captures the moment when the
expression associated with the subject matter is the most poignant), or the
creation of the subject matter of the photograph (as when the photographer
stages or creates original subject matter for photographing).106 However,
nothing in these original elements prevents another author from
photographing, painting, writing about, or otherwise using the same subject
matter (the facts) in their own original expression as long as they do not
copy the first author’s expression. 107
Copyright protection is subject to an important limitation: “the mere fact
that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work
may be protected.” 108 The requirement of originality means that copyright
protection extends only to those components of a work that are original to
the author. 109
The merger doctrine is a variation or application of the idea-expression
dichotomy. 110 When the idea and the expression of the idea are inseparable,
then the expression will not be copyrightable because it would necessarily
give the author a monopoly on the expression of the underlying idea. 111 In
generally Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 446-51 (2004).
103. Sarony., 111 U.S. at 60; Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215; Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820
(9th Cir. 2003); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992).
104. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2000); Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 794 (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 583
F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)).
105. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
106. Id. at 452-53.
107. See id. at 454; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967
F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992).
108. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
109. Id.
110. See generally Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes
à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799-848 (2006).
111. See Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986).
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other words, if there is only one way to express or depict an idea then no
one may claim a copyright in that single manner of expression or depiction
because that would evict everyone else from the right to express or depict
that idea. 112
The merger doctrine is traced to Learned Hand’s opinion in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 113 and the opinion links the principles underlying
the merger doctrine to those underlying the scenes a faire doctrine, although
neither doctrine is named in the opinion. The Nichols case involved two
literary works (a stage play and a screenplay) alleged to be substantially
similar. There was no allegation that actual scenes or actual text was copied
from the first work into the second, but Judge Hand observed that, “It is of
course essential to any protection of literary property, whether at commonlaw or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text,
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”114 The first work
involved a Jewish widower whose son secretly married an Irish Catholic
girl whose widower father was as against the union as the Jewish father
was. 115 Eventually, the two fathers reconcile in order to rejoin the company
of their respective children and grandchildren. 116 The second work involved
a Jewish family who lived in a state of animosity with their neighbors, an
Irish Catholic family. 117 The only family members not engaged in the
quarrel from the fathers to the mothers (who are present and accounted for)
to young children and family pets were the daughter of the Jewish family
and the son of the Irish family, who, as you may have guessed, secretly
marry. 118 Further conflict is introduced in that the Jewish father inherits a
sizeable sum of money, but later learns that the proper legatee is the Irish
father, and in turning over the money, he prompts an unlikely friendship
and partnership between the two fathers. 119
Judge Hand noted that,
[w]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in suit, but an
abstract of the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.1930).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 121.
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the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
[citation omitted] Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary, and nobody ever can. 120
The opinion declared that stealing lines or scenes or stealing specific
characters from a work may be actionable if it is a substantial taking, 121 but
the comparison of the similarity of two plots and storylines requires
examination of the lowest level of abstraction it takes to find the two works
to be the same; if the works are only similar at a high level of abstraction, it
will be less likely that their similarity will constitute actionable
infringement. For example, the two works at issue in Nichols may be
abstracted as follows (starting with a high level of abstraction and working
downward):
! two works about two men with children;
! two works about two men whose children marry;
! two works about two men whose children marry causing the
men grief and anger;
! two works about two men whose children marry in secret
causing the men grief and anger;
! two works about two men from different religions whose
children marry in secret causing the men grief and anger
because of their religious differences;
! two works about two men from different religions whose
children marry in secret causing the men grief and anger
because of their religious differences but who reconcile in the
end;
! two works about a Jewish man and an Irish Catholic man
whose children marry in secret causing them grief and anger
because of their religious differences but who reconcile in the
end;
and so on.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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If the level of abstraction at which the works share the most similarities
mainly involves the level of ideas (e.g., the idea of pig-headed men who
cannot get along because of religious differences; the idea of men who
overcome petty religious differences in favor of stronger values), or
generalities (e.g., problems of marriages of two people from different
religions; the situation of marriages that cause animosity in families but
later produce a kind of coexistence), or repeats plot devices and stock
themes common to many works (e.g., star-crossed lovers; feuding families
brought together by a marriage of defectors; fathers who compromise
because of love of children or grandchildren), then the works are similar at
a level where the first author cannot claim protection. The abstraction of
two literary works for comparison of the plot and storyline must not result
in a pattern of similarity that has eliminated so many disparate details of the
works that the remaining similarities are simply plot ideas, stock themes, or
common character types interacting in predictable ways. 122 This is the level
of abstraction where Judge Hand found the two works in Nichols, and he
rejected the claim for infringement. 123
The process of abstraction and comparison described in Nichols works
well in literary works where individual authors, all using a common
language (English), may discuss a common theme or plot device or
character-type or flesh out a familiar scene or stock image. In such
instances, all literary works will share commonalities if they share a
common idea but not elements that are original to one author. The idea and
the expression of the idea will merge in a literary sense as the idea itself
captures the several words and phrases necessary to communicate the idea
in writing. Judge Hand recognized that it is prudent to declare such plot
ideas, character-types, familiar scenes, and stock images as part of the
public domain, available to all authors who wish to embody the idea or
scene in their own work. 124 Thus, his decision is the grandfather of both the
merger doctrine and the scenes a faire doctrine.
In the last two decades, the merger doctrine has seen the most increase in
its application in cases concerning computer programs. Thus, synthetic
biologists should be especially mindful of merger because the source of
greatest protection for works is likely to be through the metaphor of a
computer program. As noted above, computer programs are both literary

122. Id. at 120-21.
123. Id. at 121-22.
124. See id. at 121-22.
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(the source code and object code) 125 and functional; 126 sometimes they
produce visual results, too. The argument was raised and accepted in many
computer code copyright cases that within a given programming language,
certain results (the ideas) cannot be achieved without using certain
expression (source code). 127 Thus, a merger of idea and expression was
found and sequences of source code were declared to be uncopyrightable to
avoid giving an early programmer a monopoly over a number of results in
the context of the use of a certain programming language. 128
The merger doctrine is inapplicable when the same idea can be expressed
in a plurality of different manners. 129 In these situations each author’s
creative original expression of the idea is deserving of copyright
protection. 130
A perfect example of how courts misinterpret the merger doctrine in
connection with visual works is the Ninth Circuit case of Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian. 131 In Kalpakian, the court determined that
there was only one way for the idea of a jeweled pin in the shape of a bee to
effectively be depicted.132 As a result, the court ruled that defendant could
copy plaintiff’s depiction of a jeweled bee pin because plaintiff’s depiction
was the only possible effective depiction, and plaintiff cannot claim a
copyright monopoly in the only available method of depicting an idea. 133
The idea and the depiction are one, and no one can copyright an idea.
Although this is a venerated opinion, cited and accepted for decades,134 the
opinion simply is wrong. The fallacy of the opinion is that there is only one
effective way to depict a jeweled bee pin. Nothing limits the creative
potential of the designer of a jeweled bee pin other than the simple notion

125. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 2.04[C]; see Computer Software
Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 101117) (definition of “computer program”).
126. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, § 2.18[J].
127. Id. §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B], 2.18[J]; see Mark Lemley, Convergence in the Law of
Software Copyright, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 11, 14, 16, 31 (1995).
128. An outcome that should be precluded by Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04
(1879). See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 45, §§ 2.04[C], 2.18[B].
129. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, §§ 2.3.2- 2.3.2.1.
130. Id.; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) (when a myriad of variations
of a scene are possible, a myriad of protectable copyrights can exist).
131. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. Id. at 742.
133. Id.
134. E.g., GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2 & nn. 27-30.
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that the end product should resemble a bee. 135 The amount of gold or other
metal used and exposed in the design, the size and shape and number of the
gems or semi-precious stones used, the color, tone, shade, clarity, and
brilliance of the gems or stones used, whether the gems or stones will have
few or many or no facets are simply the beginning of the creative
opportunities available to a designer of a jeweled bee pin. 136 The plaintiff
monopolizes nothing by coming out with one possible design when there
are so many other available designs. In the light of these creative
opportunities, there is no need to allow the defendant to copy plaintiff’s
single and original design.
The scenes a faire doctrine complements the merger doctrine when it is
applied to literary works. The scenes a faire doctrine provides that when
discussing a certain topic, story-line, or genre, there are certain themes,
scenes, incidents, character types, or settings which as a practical matter
must be used to properly treat the topic. 137 A literary discussion of a salmon
run will inevitably describe how they swim for hundreds of miles, fly up
over waterfalls, some are snatched in mid-air by hungry grizzly bears, and
the rest strive to return to the pools where they were spawned. Motion
pictures following the boy-meets-girl, boy-gets-girl, boy-loses-girl, boygets-girl-back storyline inevitably will employ character types of
thoughtless boys and petulant girls and contain similar scenes of
miscommunication, anger, and reconciliation in their conflict development
and conflict resolution. A discussion of the Three Stooges’ or Chris
Farley’s movies will inevitably contain references to “slap-stick,” “prat
falls,” “physical comedy,” and “self-effacing humor.” The works discussing
these scenes and themes will use similar language even at a fairly low level
of abstraction because the very idea that is being expressed requires authors
135. If the only similarity between the two works was that they both resembled a bee,
then the plaintiff’s claim of infringement properly failed. The similarity would have been
limited to the shared concept or idea of the two works, and the idea itself is not
copyrightable. If the holding of Kalpakian were limited to this proposition, the case would
be correct. But the opinion goes much farther by declaring that plaintiff produced the only
possible design and depiction of a jeweled bee, see 446 F.2d at 742, inviting every
subsequent jeweler to copy plaintiff’s bee design without limitation.
136. The record unfortunately indicates that plaintiff’s counsel was tongue-tied when it
came to explaining the different design opportunities available to the defendant. See id. at
740.
137. E.g., Atari v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 676 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982) (superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985), See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 83, § 2.3.2.2.
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to use certain terminology and phrasing. 138 An author using these terms and
phrases is not being original and cannot impose a monopoly on the terms
and phrases associated with the scene or theme. 139
When applied in the context of literary or utilitarian works, the scenes a
faire doctrine means that copyright protection is denied to common
elements of work that are essential to the presentation of the subject matter
of the work. 140 The rationale for the rule is that elements dictated by subject
matter itself necessarily lack originality. 141 Another way of looking at it is
that stock images and themes that are covered under the scenes a faire
doctrine are in the public domain and thus free to be used by all.142 In a true
scenes a faire situation, the plaintiff author is as likely to have drawn her
material from the public domain as the plagiarist is, and it is even more
likely that the alleged plagiarist need not have copied plaintiff author’s
work at all but instead could have drawn the material from the public
domain.
The scenes a faire doctrine has no proper application in the case of visual
works of living media and a very limited application in biological works.
To the extent that the idea of certain images or biological creations are in
the public domain, they are free for use whether characterized as scenes a
faire or simply themes and ideas. In the visual work context, all themes and
ideas, mundane ideas and clever ideas, stock images and innovative images,
scenes that must be done and those that are more optional, all are proper
subjects for works as long as the author does not copy the expression of
another copyrighted visual work. In other words, there is no single visual
expression of stock theme or commonplace idea that must be copied in
order for the “scene” to be “done” properly. That is why many courts have

138. See GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2.
139. Id.
140. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 21415 (3d Cir. 2002); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997). See
generally Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 9096 (1989); GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2.
141. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc., 307 F.3d at 214-15; Mitel, Inc., 124 F.3d at
1375.
142. See, e.g., Incredible Techns, Inc. v. Virtual Techns, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011-12
(7th Cir. 2005); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2004); Tufenkian
Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2003);
Computer Mgt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir.
2000).
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recognized that scenes a faire is a doctrine that applies to literary or
dramatic works. 143 It does not fit with visual works.
Synthetic biological works are similar. A copyrighted synthetic organic
creation does not preclude another biologist from working to recreate the
idea and function of the creation; but recreation does not mean copying.
Neither merger nor scenes a faire require the stripping of every expressive
aspect of a biological creation because the end product also has a function.
Computer programs are the perfect analogy here: certain elements of
display and function are stripped because there is only one way to achieve
the result using the existing (non-proprietary) computer language. 144 But the
program as a whole survives and is protected.
The idea of a soup can as the subject of a painting is in the public
domain, but Andy Warhol’s embodiment of that idea in the form of a
Warhol painting of a Campbell’s soup can is not in the public domain. 145
No artist wishing to embody the idea of a soup can in their work needs to
copy Warhol’s embodiment of that idea. They are free to paint all the soup
cans they want (in a copyright sense, without regard to the limitations of
other areas of the law, such as trademark and unfair competition and false
designation of origin laws) as long as they do not copy Warhol’s
embodiment of the idea. Jeff Koons can paint or sculpt a work embodying
the idea of two people holding a string of puppies in their lap; he just
cannot copy Art Rogers’s embodiment of that idea in the form of an Art
Rogers photograph. 146
Real world, living breathing subjects are only difficult because we have
limited (or no) experience with creations such as these. Aside from
computer programs, the closest analogy might be the treatment of
photography. Photography makes expressions out of real world, living,
breathing subjects. The difficulties in applying the idea-expression
dichotomy in photography in light of the lurking presence of the merger and
scenes a faire doctrines is revealed by comparing two cases from the federal
trial court of the Southern District of New York, Mannion v. Coors Brewing

143. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (Becker, J.
concurring); Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535
(6th Cir. 2004); Murray Hill Publications, 361 F.3d at 319-20; Cavalier v. Random House,
Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002); Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d
1280, 1286 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1996); see GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 83, § 2.3.2.2.
144. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
145. Assuming no lapse in the registration, renewal, and protection for works created
prior to 1977, the copyright should last at least until seventy years after Warhol’s death.
146. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Co. 147 and Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency. 148 In Mannion, the court
considered a photograph of basketball star Kevin Garnett who was depicted
wearing a considerable assortment of men’s jewelry. 149 A similar
photograph appeared as part of a Coor’s billboard advertisement; the
allegedly plagiarized photograph zeroed in on the hands and mid-section of
the model. 150 Similarities were noted in the heavily veined hands of the
model in both photographs, the same white athletic attire, and the same
number and type and assortment and placement of the items of jewelry
worn by the model, although the composition of the allegedly infringing
work is a mirror image of the original.151 Coors and its ad agency defended
the allegations by asserting that plaintiff’s photograph was not protectable:
it was a rendition of an unprotectable idea—a heavily bejeweled AfricanAmerican man—and any alleged similarities between the two works were
attributable to the fact that both photographers had chosen to depict the
same subject matter. Subject matter from the real world are facts, and the
idea of depicting such subject matter in a photograph is an idea, and ideas
and facts are not copyrightable.
The Mannion court rejected these assertions in their entirety. The court
noted that photographs are readily copyrightable, and the creative, original
elements are found in the photographer’s rendition of the photograph, the
timing of the photograph, or the creation of the subject matter of the
photograph. 152 The court noted the originality of plaintiff’s creation and the
rendition of the subject matter and the substantial similarity between
defendants’ depiction and plaintiff’s, 153 and denied defendants’ summary
judgment motion.
In this way, a biologist is not creating a completely utilitarian work but a
rendition of the idea of a work with utilitarian functionality. The creation is
a work of the mind, satisfying the creativity aspect of copyright, and
original, because it is not copied. The idea of the function and utility

147. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
148. 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
149. The court referred to it as “bling bling.” 377 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
150. Id. at 448.
151. See id. and Images 1 and 2 attached to the opinion.
152. Id. at 452-53.
153. Id. at 456 (“The ‘idea’ (if one wants to call it that) [of the photograph] postulated by
the defendants does not even come close to accounting for all the similarities between the
two works, which extend at least to angle, pose, background, composition, and lighting. It is
possible to imagine any number of depictions of a black man wearing a white T-shirt and
‘bling bling’ that look nothing like either of the photographs at issue here.”).
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remains open for the next biologist to pursue and create a rendition of her
own.
In Kaplan, the court declared that the second of two photographs
depicting a person in businessman’s attire staring down at their feet
dangling over the edge of a tall building as if contemplating a leap from the
edge (i.e., a photograph of a potential executive jumper taken from the
jumper’s perspective) could not be held to infringe the first because the
general similarity between the two works was attributed to the two
photographers’ choices to depict the same subject matter, and any direct
similarities between the actual photographs was necessitated by the
common scene and subject matter of the photographs. 154 If that were the
extent of the discussion, the case would gel nicely with Mannion; but the
court goes on to state that “it would be impossible to depict the
photograph’s subject matter without portraying [the subject] in [the] pose”
selected by the original photographer.155 Then, the court incongruously
identifies several aspects of the two photographers’ rendition or staging of
the photograph that were freely open to artistic creativity: the point of view
of the photograph (bird’s eye, over the shoulder, frontal, below from a far
angle, below from a direct upward angle, or from the jumper’s point of
view), the cropping of the photograph (close up, medium, wide angle), the
angle of the jumper’s perspective (e.g., whether it took in a snippet of pinstriped pants legs or a knee to shoe length of pin-striped pants legs), the
shading of the street below in the one photograph and the inclusion of a
second building closely abutting the opposite side of the street in the other
photograph. 156 With respect to the point of view, the court even admits:
“There may be, as [plaintiff] Kaplan suggests, many other angles from
which to depict this scene . . .” 157 Nevertheless, the court believed that each
artistic decision of the original photographer was dictated by the merger of
the subject matter with the depiction and any specific elements of the
depiction not merged with the idea of the subject matter were scenes a faire
of the scene depicted.158
Kaplan is a cautionary tale for synthetic biologists. It may be that a
challenger will assert that the biological functioning of a synthetic organic
creation can only be achieved in the exact form and expression as that of
the first biologist. Thus, others must be permitted to copy that form and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See 133 F. Supp. 2d at 323-28.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 323-25 & n.10.
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expression or the first biologist will have a monopoly on a useful,
functional idea achieved not in patent law but in copyright law. 17 U.S.C. §
102 precludes this monopoly.
The difference between Kaplan and Mannion is that the Mannion court
correctly rejects the application of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines to
visual works because it held that the idea-expression distinction should be
severely limited in cases involving visual works. Mannion discussed the
abstraction analysis of Nichols and the concept of the “line” that must be
drawn where the second work takes too much protected original expression
because it encompasses too specific an abstraction of the first work. 159
Mannion stated that with respect to visual media, such as photography:
the line itself is meaningless because the conceptual categories it
purports to delineate are ill-suited to the subject matter. . . . The
idea/expression distinction arose in the context of literary
copyright. For the most part, the Supreme Court has not applied
it outside that context. . . . In the visual arts, the distinction
breaks down. . . . [O]ne cannot divide a visual work into neat
layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could
with a text. . . . [L]ittle is gained by attempting to distinguish an
unprotectible “idea” from its protectible “expression” in a
photograph or other work of visual art. . . . The idea/expression
distinction in photography, and probably the other visual arts,
thus achieves nothing . . . [and] is not useful or relevant.160
The Mannion opinion preserves the creative original components of
photography and original combinations of unprotectable components that
are meant to be protected under the holdings of Feist and Sarony. It
accomplishes this by limiting the application of the idea-expression
distinction in cases involving visual works and rejecting the expansive
application of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines to visual works.
C. Effects of the Expanding Application of the Merger and Scenes a faire
Doctrines on Living Works
The courts have not been content to limit
doctrine and the scenes a faire doctrine to
Instead, courts have applied these doctrines
visual works wherein the elements of visual

the application of the merger
literary or dramatic settings.
to claims of infringement of
works that are claimed to be

159. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
160. Id. at 458, 459, 461 (inner citations and reference to inner quotations omitted).
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unprotected under the merger doctrine or scenes a faire doctrine are filtered
out and purposefully ignored when comparing a competing work against
the original in a test of substantial similarity. 161 The results in far too many
cases is that visual works are reduced down to nothing which further results
in the award of summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law for the
defendant before the finder of fact even gets a chance to make an intrinsic
evaluation of the substantial similarity of the two works. With living visual
media, there are opposing cases that do not strip away the works, and the
artist should exploit this body of cases to the fullest. 162This points to two
recommendations for synthetic biology: make multiple records,
descriptions, and depictions of the biological creation so as to multiple the
elements that might be protected under copyright
A biologist or her lawyer may argue that it is enough if the printout of
the sequence she identified or created is protected, then she can enjoy the
further protection from other biologists who might use “her” sequence for
their own ends through the operation of the copyright derivative use rights.
This is true, but comes with certain limitations.
One, if the sequence merely is identified, in what way is a copyright over
the description of the sequence to prevent others from “finding” the same
sequence in the world, or further to prevent others from replicating the
sequence or using it for their own ends. The first person to identify a
species and write up a careful, scientific description of the species, does not
obtain the right to prevent others from breeding the species, working with
the species, or even from writing about the species. Similarly, the first
person who discovered the properties of natural substances, such as
petroleum or natural gas, and wrote up a careful description of these
properties, did not obtain the right to prevent others from working with the
natural substances, or even to write about the substances. All that is
protected is the actual word-for-word terms used by the first author. Not
even the ideas represented by those terms are subject to protection.
Two, if the sequences are created, the issue is a bit more friendly to the
concept of copyrightability, but the issue remains whether a dynamic,

161. The most common formulation of the test is called the abstraction-filtrationcomparison test, which is traced to Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in the
evaluation of similarity of merged and scenes a faire elements of computer programs).
162. E.g., Mattel v. Goldberger Doll, Bannion, etc. See generally Michael D. Murray,
Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual
Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799-848 (2006).
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replicative, and perennial component of living organisms 163 may be subject
to a copyright monopoly. The issue may be cast as, is the biologist truly the
author of this life, not God or Mother Nature? Hopefully, this is answered
by the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the patent-eligibility of living,
organic creations coupled with the analogy that biological works are like
computer programs with expressive, albeit functional characteristics.
VI. Conclusion
The answer is that copyright can protect a great many aspects of
synthetic biological creations. The subject matter issue is best addressed by
application of the metaphor that synthetic biological creations are like
computer programs. This also provides a recognizable framework for the
analysis and large body of precedent that will allow the creations to
withstand the merger and scenes a faire doctrines that competitors will
attempt to use to strip away non-copyrightable elements of the creations.
Fixation and authorship seem easier to resolve: the concepts in copyright
law are not meant to impose heavy burdens on authors. Fixation has one
practical requirement: can you observe the creation sufficiently with the
senses or through some mechanical means so that you know what it is and
can avoid copying it. It is incongruous to suppose that it means works
cannot occasionally be in motion, or grow and develop, or age, wither, and
change their expression over time. Virtually all works made with organic or
naturally occurring materials would be banned from copyright if this logic
were correct. The same can be said of authorship. No one copyrights natural
forces. Aspects of a work that are attributable to natural forces cannot be
claimed within the copyright of artists or scientists because they are not
created by them. Many of the changes observed or predicted in works are
not part of the copyright of the original artist because they were not created
by the artist. The decaying of paint or the decaying of the life of an organic
creation is not claimed under copyright unless the artist brings it about
through a conception and application of a work of the mind. But the
expressive, communicative aspects of the work may be protected in all of
the forms created and recorded by the artist or scientist. In the end, this may
be an acceptable formula for the protection of scientific and artistic works
of living media.

163. My thanks are given once again to Osman Mirza, my consultant on synthetic
biology, for supplying the proper descriptors here.

